ELITZE separates connector code, credentials, configured state, successful probes, and observed records. A provider name or secret variable is not proof of an operational integration. Each tenant connector must pass its provider-specific authentication and runtime check.
Control plane
Unavailable integrations are labeled not configured. Missing evidence is described as not verified or not measurable.
Import airodump-ng CSV survey output through an authenticated API. ELITZE records access-point identifiers, SSID, channel, encryption type, and survey signal metadata. It ignores client/station records and never stores raw CSV or recovered keys. Use only for authorized wireless assessments; packet injection and password cracking are not exposed through the web app.
Import Nmap XML scan results through an authenticated API. ELITZE records live-host and confirmed open-port/service observations in the tenant security graph; it rejects DTD/entity declarations and does not persist raw XML or NSE script output. Scan execution belongs on an authorized runner, not a public web server.
A separately deployed HTTPS bridge adapts the local Metasploit MessagePack RPC interface. ELITZE can verify bridge health and observe session metadata. The bridge URL and token are server-side secrets; this web endpoint does not expose arbitrary module/exploit execution.
Import John --show audit output as summary evidence. ELITZE records cracked/remaining counts and audit metadata only. Plaintext passwords and account labels are never persisted by the importer; run password audits on a controlled, authorized worker.
Tenant model connections use the standard NVIDIA NIM /v1 endpoint. Keys are encrypted at rest; GET /v1/models validates endpoint reachability and selected model availability. Inference success is tracked separately.
The security control path maps an authenticated agent/workload identity to MCP servers, tools, policy decisions, and auditable evidence. Unobserved relationships stay unknown.
NVD, CISA KEV, and FIRST EPSS provide external reference records. They do not establish that a CVE is present or reachable on a customer's asset.
Source adapters require real credentials, endpoint configuration, permissions, and a successful probe or authenticated ingest. A repository implementation alone remains IMPLEMENTED, not CONNECTED.
ELITZE implements bounded recursive consistency review inside LangGraph. A separate direct Recursive vendor API adapter is not claimed because a supported public API contract is not configured.
The authenticated MCP endpoint supports Google Search Console Search Analytics and GA4 Data API reports with a real access token and authorized property. Without them, performance figures remain unavailable.